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Abstract 
According to traditional trade theory, trade reduces inequality between the rich and the poor. 
However, since the beginning of the 1980s, a constantly rise in within-country inequality 
has been observed in many developed and developing countries. With the rapidly 
increasing globalization during the same period in mind, a natural question to ask is 
whether the two phenomenon are linked. In this paper I investigate the links between trade 
protection and inequality for a panel of 26 middle-income countries during the period 2000-
2012. I additionally examine whether the level of protection in specific industries is of 
importance for the relationship. I do this by using both an OLS model and an FE model. I 
find no evidence for the effect of general protection on inequality, although general trade is 
found to reduce inequality. Further, I find the effect of sectorial protection on inequality to 
strongly depend on the industry and region that is being considered.  
 
Keywords: inequality, globalization, trade protection, middle-income countries, sectorial 
protection. 
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1 Introduction  
During the past three decades, a pattern of constantly rising within-country inequality has been 
observed in many countries. Before this, the inequality had been constantly declining during 
the first half of the twentieth century. This rise in the global inequality seems to rather be 
explained by larger shares of rich quintiles than poor quintiles, whose income have not changed 
much. Alongside this development, many developing countries adopted a trade liberalization 
path and opened up their economies towards the world market in the 1980s (International 
Monetary Fund, 2007). Against this background, a natural question to ask is whether the 
observed rise in inequality has been related to the rapidly increasing globalization during the 
same time period.  
Economic theory is divided regarding the impact of trade on inequality. The traditional theory, 
which takes its departure in the Heckscher-Ohlin model and the extended version of Stolper-
Samuelson, predicts that trade leads countries into producing and exporting products that 
intensively uses the country´s abundant factors in its production. Hence, trade is expected to 
favour the abundant factors in the economy. For developing countries, this implies that the 
gains from trade should fall on the unskilled labour, for which developing countries generally 
are abundant. Hence, the wage gap, and thus inequality, between the rich and the poor is 
believed to decrease in developing countries after a trade liberalization. This theory is however 
challenged by more recent trade theory, which rather than focusing on trade in final goods 
focuses on trade in intermediate inputs. These intermediate inputs are traded between countries 
and combined to a final product, and is believed to generate a shift in the demand for skills 
within industries that lead developed countries into focusing on production of skill-intensive 
inputs and imports less skill-intensive inputs from developing countries. Thus, the demand for 
skilled labour is believed to increase in developed countries. However, the production that is 
considered low skill-intensive in developed countries that is transferred to developing 
countries, is actually is more skill intensive than previous production in the developing 
countries. Thus the demand for skilled labour is believed to increase in developing countries as 
well. Thus, this theory predicts that by increasing the demand for skilled labour in both 
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developed and developing countries, trade leads to a general rise in the relative wage of skilled 
labour and thereby increases income-inequality.  
The cross-country studies of the links between trade and inequality generally suffers from the 
lack of comparable data across countries and over time, which has restricted the previous 
studies to cover rather small samples sizes. The results from these studies vary and it has been 
difficult to establish a general relationship between trade and inequality as well as determining 
its strength. There are, however, several country-specific studies that have proved inequality to 
rise after an introduction of a trade liberalization due to the technology upgrading and hence 
increased demand for skilled labour that it led to.  
The objective of this paper is to fill the gap of lacking panel data analyses on the relationship 
between trade exposure and inequality. More, it investigates the links between trade protection 
and inequality for 26 middle-income countries during the period of 2000-2012. The main 
contribution of this paper to the literature is that it additionally examines whether the level of 
protection for specific industries is of importance for the relationship. That is, by disentangling 
the level of protection according to industry it is possible to investigate whether the allocation 
of trade protection is biased towards specific sectors and whether this affects the income 
distribution within developing countries. Hence, this way the inequality intensity of trade in 
different industries may be detected. Further, the measure of protection used in this study 
differs from those of similar studies, and is based on the maximum tariff level for specific 
industries according to the Harmonized System (HS). Knowing how trade exposure in specific 
industries affects inequality is of major importance for future trade policies concerning 
development strategies for developing countries. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in section 2, the literature on trade and 
inequality will be described. Section 3 presents the empirical approach and explains the 
econometric specification. Section 4 presents the data used in the analysis. Section 5 presents 
the results and various sensitivity tests of the results. Section 6 discusses the results and finally 
concludes.   
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2 The Literature on Inequality and Trade 
In this section I aim to explain the underlying economic theory as well as the empirical 
evidence of the relationship between trade exposure and inequality. The theoretical part will 
cover both traditional and modern economic theory, and in the empirical evidence several 
studies that focus on examining the same relationship although with varying methods and 
results will be presented. 
2.1 Theoretical Framework 
The traditional theory of the links between trade and inequality is much driven by the insights 
of Eli Heckscher and Bertil Ohlin and the extension of their model by Stolper-Samuelson. The 
Heckscher-Ohlin model was developed in the early 20:th century, and has been a workhorse 
model of international trade since for studies of the links between trade exposure and 
inequality. The model predicts that each country will produce and export goods that use its 
abundant factor intensively (Feenstra, 2003). This implies that developing countries, being 
abundant in unskilled-labour, are expected to produce and export products that are unskilled-
labour-intensive such as textiles and handicraft. Similarly, developed countries are expected to 
produce and export skilled-labour-intensive products, such as machinery, for which they have 
abundance.  
By studying this scenario from the simplest setting of the Hechscher-Ohlin model, that is, from 
a two-country, two-factor, two-good setting (the 2*2*2 model) also called the Hechksher-
Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model, the following effects are likely to occur; in the developing 
country, trading with a developed country raises the price of the developing country´s unskilled 
workers, implying raised wages, while reducing the wages of the skilled workers. Similarly, the 
developed country can expect higher wages for their skilled workers, due to the increased 
demand for skills, as well as reduced wages for the unskilled workers, when trading with a 
developing country. Accordingly, the wage inequality is expected to decrease in the developing 
country, while it is expected to increase in the developed country. Hence, according to the 
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Heckscher-Ohlin theory, developing countries should benefit from globalization in terms of 
decreased wage inequality. For this theory to hold, the factor price equalization, stating that 
trade between two countries with universal technology but different factor endowments will 
lead to equalized factor prices due to the interaction of their goods markets, has to hold. The 
Hechscher-Ohlin model was further extended to a theorem developed by Stolper-Samuelson in 
1941. The theorem states that, as the relative price of a good increase, the real return to the 
factor used intensively in its production will rise, whereas the return to the other factor will fall, 
and vice versa (Feenstra, 2003). Thus, as prices changes due to a trade chock, there will be 
income distributional effects where some factors are favoured and others are disfavoured. For 
instance, if a trade reform is introduced, which reduces the protection and hence the price of the 
imported good, the developing country will be able to concentrate its production on the good 
that uses its abundant factor intensively, and import the other good cheaper. Thus, trade is 
expected to lead to increased demand and thus a rise in the real return of unskilled labour. 
Hence, the unskilled workers in developing countries are expected to benefit from increased 
trade, and the inequality is consequently expected to decrease according to the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem (Feenstra, 2003).  
However, the model can be expanded to include several countries, several traded goods as well 
as production several factors, and is called the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) model, based on 
the work of Vanek (1968). In this framework, the effects from trade are somewhat different 
from that of the 2x2x2 model. When only two countries trade, each country exports the product 
that uses its abundant factor intensively. In a multi-country situation, each country exports a set 
of goods that intensively uses its abundant factors. However, when there is no factor price 
equalization, factor prices are rather determined by the factor’s relative abundances. Thus, 
abundant factors have lower prices, which create specialization patterns based on countries 
abundances. Countries then become very different from each other due to the differences in the 
distribution of endowments, and a hierarchic production patterns may arise (Feenstra, 2003). 
By moving on to newer trade theory, recent evidence of increasing wage gaps may be 
explained. Evidence show that since the early 1980s there has been a significant increase in 
skill-premiums, favouring skilled workers relative to unskilled workers. This development has 
been seen in both countries such as the US as well as in developing countries. The demand for 
skilled labour has increased which has lead to increase their relative employment and wages, 
implying a sustained increase in the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled workers. 
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Hence, although the Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts decreasing wage gaps as a result of 
trade, late evidence show the opposite. So, why has there been an outward shift in the demand 
for skilled labour? According to Stolper-Samuelson, if the return to skill-intensive goods 
increases so does the relative price of the factor it uses intensively in its production. However, 
no such increase in the relative price of skill-intensive goods can be seen (Feenstra, 2003).  
This development can rather be explained by a newer theory accounting for trade in 
intermediate goods instead of merely trade with final goods. This is also called outsourcing or 
offshoring and implies that firms split their production processes into several stages and to 
several plants located in different countries. The components that are cheaper to produce 
abroad, generally unskilled labour-intensive inputs if the country in focus is a skill abundant 
developed country, are thus imported to a lower price than if they were produced at home. 
Hence, the focus in this theory is on activities with different skill-intensities within industries 
rather than between industries, which when we trade is believed to generate shifts in the 
relative demand for skilled labour. The reason for this is that if there is a trade shock with the 
effect of reducing the relative price of the imported inputs, then the home production of the 
other input will increase and the relative prices of the inputs will change. The demand thus 
increases for skilled labour at home, since the focus is on a developed country, while it falls for 
unskilled. As the demand for unskilled labour falls, so does its real return the result is an 
increasing wage gap between skilled and unskilled labour. This is also called a “within Stolper-
Samuelson-effect”, and it is likely to occur in developed countries. Since the price of the 
finished good is a weighted average of the two inputs, no substantial price change in the final 
good is seen as just as recent evidence shows (Feenstra, 2003).  
However, there is a distinction in the literature between two possible causes for the increased 
skill-premiums; the trade explanation just described, and a technology explanation, which may 
be associated to the similar pattern of increased skill-premiums in developing countries. 
However, these two explanations are likely related.  When developing countries open up to 
trade they come in contact with new and more advanced technology for which skilled labour is 
required. In order for firms that decide to engage in exports to keep up with the competition 
from abroad, newer technologies and strategies might have to be undertaken, which 
consequently increases the demand for skilled labour in countries that experienced a trade 
liberalization (Wood, 1995). There can also be a technology-induced change in skill-premiums 
in developing countries after trade liberalization due to that they start to import more high-
technology equipment in order to upgrade from their labour-intensive production and devote to 
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a more capital-intensive production. Such capital-intensive production might be machinery or 
agribusiness. This shift in production may require skilled labour more intensively in its 
production, and thus increases the demand for skills as well (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 2004).  
Exporting in general requires more from firms than operating on the domestic market due to the 
productivity and sunk-costs associated with exporting. Melitz (2003) argues that in order for a 
firm to survive and make profit on the exports market it needs to maintain a certain level of 
productivity, which is higher than that needed to serve on the domestic market. Higher 
productivity requires better technology, which in turn requires higher skills among the workers. 
So, exporters are believed to be more capital and skill-intensive than non-exporters. Thus, when 
opening up to trade a reallocation of resources will take place, moving the skilled labour to the 
more productive export firms which are believed to expand and thus increase the overall 
productivity in a country. Hence, there will be a general increase in the demand of skilled 
workers at the expense of the less skilled labour, as a result. According to, among others, 
Bernard et al. (2012), another characteristic of exporting firms is that they tend to pay higher 
wages to their employees, which together with their demand for skilled workers is believed to 
further increase the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers.  
2.2 Earlier Empirical Research 
There is a large amount of studies that focus on the links between trade openness and 
inequality. However, just like the theoretical literature, the empirical evidence is contradictory. 
What mainly differ in these studies is the measurement of trade and inequality. Some of these 
studies are presented below. Meschi and Vivarelli (2007) distinguish between an import 
channel and an export channel when investigating the dynamic effects of trade. The import 
channel is believed to affect inequality through the flow of capital goods and innovations, 
which induces developing countries to upgrade their technologies in order to keep up with 
advanced economies. As discussed in the theoretical part, this technological upgrading 
consequently increases the demand for skilled labour. This is also argued for by Acemoglu 
(2003), who shows that skill-biased technical change induced by trade caused increased skill-
premiums in both US and developing countries trading with US, without affecting the price of 
the skill-intensive goods, as the standard theory would predict.  
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The export channel, on the other hand, is believed to affect inequality due to the observed 
heterogeneity among exporting and non-exporting firms, as argued by Melitz (2003). When 
firms start to explore foreign markets they get exposed to learning-by-doing opportunities, 
which allow them to adopt newer technology. Technical assistance from the buyer in order to 
improve the quality of the product is also a way for the exporter to acquire knowledge (Meschi 
& Vivarelli, 2007). Thus, the demand for skilled labour is believed to increase due to the export 
channel as well. Bernard and Jensen (1995) find evidence for the export channel in the US 
while studying the determinants of the observed increase in the demand for skilled labour 
during the 1980s. The authors study changes in the wage ratio of unskilled (production) and 
skilled (non-production) workers as well as in employment, and compare the effects between 
exporters and non-exporting firms in the manufacturing sector. Their results indicate that 
exporters in fact are a substantial force behind the observed increase in skill-premiums. The 
change in skilled labour’s wages that this contributes to is believed to arise from movements 
between plants within industries, transferring skilled labour to exporting firms. This 
reallocation of resources is motivated with technology upgrading by exporting firms, which 
inflates the demand for skilled labour.  
Wood (1997), however, states several studies such as Krueger et al. (1981), Fischer and 
Spinanger (1986), Lee and Liang (1982), Nambiar and Tadas (1994), which study the 
relationship between trade and inequality in developing countries. When calculating the ratio of 
skilled to unskilled labour that is required in the production of the goods that the countries 
exports and imports respectively, all of them find that in the majority of the cases the exports is 
less skill-intensive compared to imports. This finding generally supports the traditional view of 
trade being beneficial for unskilled workers. 
Attanasio, Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) further investigate the relationship in Colombia during 
the period 1984-1998 by linking micro-level data from Colombian National Household Survey 
(NHS) to trade exposure for the same period. The country experienced a major trade 
liberalization period with reduced tariffs in mid-1980. Prior to this period the country had not 
taken part in the GATT rounds and had therefore still high tariff levels, which was 
advantageous for the study. The authors use two measures for inequality; the standard deviation 
of log wages and the difference between the ninetieth and tenth percentile of the log wage 
distribution. The paper focuses on skill premiums, industry premium occupations and 
informality discounts as the major channels through which trade might affect inequality. As the 
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theory suggests, the authors find evidence of skill-biased technological change caused by trade 
as one likely reason for the increased skill premium observed in Colombia. Further, they find 
decreasing wage premiums in sectors that got more exposed to trade. These sectors had the 
largest shares of unskilled labour. Hence, as the tariffs were reduced and the price of unskilled-
intensive goods fell, so did the return to the unskilled labour, as in accordance with the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem. They finally find that as the foreign competition increases, so does the 
informal sector. The informal sector is often characterized by lacking labour market regulations 
such as minimum wages, and is generally larger in developing countries (Goldberg & Pavcnik, 
2004). This sector is believed to increase after a trade liberalization since firms face higher 
costs due to increased competition, which they often try to reduce by cutting employee benefits. 
Due to the lower quality of the informal job sector, the general inequality is hence believed to 
increase as this sector expands.  
Hanson and Harrison (1999) find similar results for Mexico in a paper investigating the impact 
of trade reform. Mexico implemented a trade reform in 1985, prior to which the wage gap had 
been declining. After the reform, however, the difference between the wages of the skilled and 
the unskilled workers began to rise. Just as in the Colombian case, the authors suggest a skewed 
pattern of tariff reduction where sectors with higher share of unskilled workers experienced the 
largest reduction. However, they also discuss other likely causes of the increased wage 
inequality such as technological change, direct foreign investment as well as export orientation. 
Topalova (2007), Savvides (1998) and Vivarelli (2007) use methodological frameworks closer 
to that of this study when examining the links between trade and inequality. Topalova (2007) 
investigates the relationship between trade and poverty and inequality in urban and rural India 
by looking at the effects of a trade liberalization period that the country experienced in the 
1990s. She constructs a district-level trade exposure variable through weighing average tariff 
levels in specific sectors by the workers employed in the sector as a share of all registered 
workers. For the dependent inequality variable she uses both the standard deviation of log 
consumption and the mean logarithmic deviation of consumption as measures. By comparing 
industries subject to larger tariff reduction with those that remained protected, a difference-in-
difference approach, she enables short- to medium-run regional outcomes of trade liberalization 
to be encountered. Although she finds that reduced tariffs decrease the poverty in the rural parts 
of India, no such statistically significant result can be obtained for inequality.  
  12 
Savvides (1998) further analyses the relationship by studying the effect of trade protection on 
inequality and distinguishing the effects between developed and developing countries during 
the 1980s and 1990s. In order to measure trade protection Savvides uses a variable for non-
tariff trade barriers (NTBs) constructed by Lee and Swagel (1997). Due to the declining tariff 
levels after several GATT rounds and the increasing importance of NTBs, NTBs are the main 
focus in this study when measuring the trade restrictions. In line with the methodology of this 
paper, Savvides regresses several indicators of trade protection on the Gini-coefficient. He 
finds a negative relationship between protection and inequality in developing countries. That is, 
the more protected the economies the lower the inequality. The opposite effect was found for 
developed countries.  
Finally, Mesche and Vivarelli (2007) investigate how trade affects inequality in 70 developing 
countries during the period 1980-1999. Additionally, they disaggregate the total trade flows by 
their areas of origin and destination in order to investigate whether trading with advanced 
economies alternatively with other less advanced economies matters in terms of inequality. 
They regress total aggregate trade flows on within-country measured as EHII household 
income inequality, but only find a small and barely significant positive effect. However, they 
are able to proof that the income-characteristics of the trading partner largely matters for 
inequality in developing countries. Trading with high-income countries is negative for the 
income distribution, whereas trading with less developed countries does not affect inequality or 
has a small opposite effect. This result further strengthens the hypothesis of technological 
differences being of major importance for the effect of trade openness on income distribution. 
However, when distinguishing between low-income countries and middle-income countries, 
instead of pooling them together, the authors find that this result is strongly associated to 
middle-income countries, rather than to the low-income countries. This result can be interpreted 
by recognizing the higher absorptive capacity in middle-income countries, facilitating 
technological upgrading to technology developed in advanced economies and thus stronger 
affect the skill demand.  
By reviewing previous empirical research it becomes clear that earlier studies tend to find that 
trade reduces inequality, whereas more recent studies rather find that trade increases inequality. 
The reasons for this may be the differences in the structure of trade, where modern trade is 
more dominated by intermediate goods than by final goods as earlier. It may also be that the 
methodological approach in earlier studies differs from those of recent ones, which are able to 
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account for unobserved heterogeneity. Hence, recent studies may be able to capture the 
importance of other policies than trade policies when explaining the relationship between trade 
and inequality, which may generate other results.  
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3 Empirical Approach 
The empirical framework of this paper will differ from those of previous studies in two 
manners: first, as stated in section 2, the majority of previous studies are based on cross-
sectional, alternatively time-series analyses. However, in this paper the impact of trade on 
inequality of a panel of 26 countries over the period 2000-2012 will be analyzed. Secondly, 
instead of merely looking at general trade protection as in accordance with previous literature, 
additionally, protection in six different industries will be compared in order to detect to which 
extent they affect the Gini-variable in each country.  
 
3.1 Specification 
 The econometrical strategy of this paper will follow that of Savvides (1998), and regress 
several openness and protectionism measures on the level of inequality. Hence, equation 2 is 
the baseline specification: 
ginii,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 gdpci,t + 𝛽2 proti,t + 𝛽3 inflationi,t + 𝛽4 (gdpc*prot )i,t+ 𝛽5 tradei,t + 𝛽6uppermidi,t 
+ 𝛽7lowermidi,t + 𝛾t + 𝛿i + 𝜀i,t                      (2) 
where gini is the country-level Gini-coefficient, gdpc is the per-capita GDP growth for each 
year and country, prot is the variable for general protectionism based on the average of the 
collected maximum tariff levels in the six industries, inflation is the inflation rate, (gdpc*prot) 
is an interaction term aiming to detect whether the relation between protection and inequality 
varies with income, trade is a variable for the ratio of imports plus exports over GDP, and 
finally uppermid and lowermid are dummies indicating income level groups. This model is 
estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as well as with Fixed Effects where it further 
includes a year dummy variable controlling for time effects, 𝛾t, and a country dummy variable 
controlling for country-specific effects, 𝛿i. By estimating the model with the Fixed Effects (FE) 
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method, the country-specific effects may capture the long-run NTBs that do not vary over time. 
All variables are expressed in natural logarithms.  
The model will further be extended to distinguish between the inequality intensity of trade 
protectionism in different industries. Hence, it will include variables for the maximum tariff 
level in each sector respectively for each country and year in order to see how these correlate 
with the Gini-coefficient. The extended model has the following equation: 
ginii,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 gdpci,t + 𝛽2 inflationi,t + 𝛽3 (gdpc*prot)i,t + 𝛽4 tradei,t + 𝛽5foodproti,t + 𝛽6oilproti,t 
+ 𝛽7electronicsproti,t + 𝛽8vehiclesproti,t + 𝛽9armsproti,t + 𝛽10textileproti,t + 𝛾t + 𝛿i + 𝜀i,t                                                     
       (3) 
where gini and the first four variables are the same as in equation (2), followed by the variables 
for the level of protection in the sectors of food, oil and minerals, electronics and machinery, 
vehicles, arms and ammunition, and finally in the textile sector. This regression will also be 
estimated with OLS as well as with Fixed Effects where it additionally includes dummy 
variables to control for time- and country-specific effects.  
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4 Data 
The dataset used in this paper consists of a panel of 26 middle-income countries over the period 
2000-2012. The countries are approximately equally divided between upper-middle-, and 
lower-middle-income countries according to the World Bank’s country classification by 
income (see Appendix A for country list). 
 The main aim of this paper is to look at the variation in the degree of inequality within the 
countries followed by different levels of trade protection. The degree of inequality is  measured 
by the Gini-coefficient. The Gini index measures the extent to which a population deviates 
from perfectly distributed income or expenditure. A Gini-coefficient of 0 indicates perfectly 
equally shared income, whereas a coefficient of 1 implies one person having all of the 
country’s income (International Monetary Fund, 2007). Although inequality is difficult to 
measure and there exists several other indicators such as the Theil’s entropy measure, the 
Atkinson index as well as decile and quintile ratios, the Gini-coefficient is a commonly used 
summary index within research. However, the indicator is not perfect and involves some issues 
when compared across countries and over time. One main reason is that the rates of self-
employment in agriculture in developing countries generally are high, which may imply 
fluctuating incomes during year. Thus, indexes based on household consumption tend to show 
lower inequality than those based on income. Differences in the definition of inequality, in 
indicators of inequality on household and individual level, as well as in the methods used in the 
household surveys further complicate comparisons (International Monetary Fund, 2007).  The 
data on inequality is taken from the World Bank Human Development Indicators database. The 
inequality data is available for a large set of countries, although only complete for a small set. 
The incompleteness of the inequality data has restricted the choice of countries to 26 middle-
income countries of which the majority is Latin American.  
Measuring trade exposure is a difficult and complex task and there is not one correct way to do 
it. One common strategy is to use trade barriers as an indicator of a country’s outward 
orientation. However, the use of only one single indicator, such as tariffs, might give a 
misleading and unrealistic image of the situation. For instance, the use of only tariffs as an 
indicator of openness might indicate great openness due to low tariffs even though the non-
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tariff trade barriers continue high. For that reason, many previous studies include both tariffs 
and non-tariff trade barriers (NTBs) into their models. Lee and Swagel (1997), for instance, 
propose different measures of NTBs. Among these is the black-market premium as well as 
import- and export as shares of GDP. Due to the GATT restrictions of decreasing tariff levels, 
NTBs have increasingly become a tool for trade protection, which further motivates its 
importance when estimating trade exposure (Lee & Swagel, 1994). For this panel data set, 
however, a ratio of import plus export over GDP will be included as an explanatory variable.  
The empirical strategy of this paper will follow that of Savvides (1998) and estimate the effect 
of different levels of trade protection on country-level inequality. However, the protection 
variable in this paper will differ from that of Savvides. Savvides uses Lee and Swagel’s (1997) 
composed measure of trade protection, focusing on non-tariff barriers (NTB’s) due to its 
increasing importance. This measure is based on several NTB determinants such as the black-
market premium, tariff rates and other sector-specific indicators. However, due to the 
difficulties in accessing such specific data when working with a panel data, the measure of 
protection in this study will differ. Here, the general protection variable is constructed as the 
average of the sum of maximum tariff rates for the six different manufacturing sectors stated 
under, for each country and year. That is, the country level protection is computed according to 
equation 1: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡!,!,! = !!"#$%&%  !"#$%%!,!,!!"  !"  !"#$%&'()%   (1) 
where i is the country, t is the year and s is the industry. Hence, the maximum tariff for every 
industry are summed for each country and year, and thereafter divided by the number of 
industries. The reason for using the maximum tariffs is that they demonstrate most variety and 
also depicts the countries with the absolutely highest tariff levels. Hence, it makes it possible to 
identify whether the country has generally high tariff levels among the industries. 
Further, as this paper aims to detect whether the allocation of sectorial trade protection matters 
for the impact on inequality, variables for trade protection in every specific industry will 
additionally be included into the model. By looking at the distribution of tariffs across different 
sectors, potential biasness in tariff rates across industries may be found, and their effect on 
inequality may be determined. The tariff data used in this paper is two-digit level data of the 
Harmonized System (HS). The HS is a system for classification of traded goods on a common 
basis developed by the World Customs Organization (World Trade Organization, n.d.). Since 
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the focus is on general openness towards other countries for which a country does not have a 
specific agreement, the ad valorem most favored nation (MFN) applied duty rates are used. Six 
different manufacturing industries are included and compared. The first industry is the food 
sector, corresponding to chapters 01-05 of the HS. The second and third industries are those of 
oil and mineral as well as machinery and electronics, which corresponds to HS chapter 25-27 
and chapter 84-85 respectively. The fourth included industry is the vehicles (non-aircraft) 
sector, or HS chapter 87. Finally the fifth and sixth industries are the arms and ammunition as 
well as the textile sector, corresponding to HS chapters 93 and 50-63, respectively. This data 
was taken from the World Trade Organization’s tariff database. Using the maximum tariffs for 
specific industries further enables to detect whether the tariff distribution within a country is 
biased towards specific industries and whether this matters for inequality.    
More, per-capita GDP growth and the inflation rate are included as control variables in the 
regression since they are likely to affect inequality. Data for both variables is taken from the 
World Bank Database. Economic growth is introduced into the model in order to investigate its 
relationship to inequality in developing countries. Often, trade and trade agreements with 
developing countries are motivated with increased growth. Kuznets, in a paper from 1955, 
suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship between inequality and per-capita GDP growth. He 
argued that in the initial stage of industrialization technological development increases the 
demand for skilled labor and capital, favoring the higher-income groups and thereby widening 
inequality. This pattern eventually stabilizes and finally narrows at later stages as the economy 
and society catch up on the development (Kuznetz, 1955).  
The inflation rate is an indicator of the macroeconomic environment and is also relevant for the 
model. Inflation might have the effect off disproportionally eroding real incomes, affecting the 
low-income population hardest, and hence leading to increasing inequality. This becomes of 
even greater relevance in developing countries where the macroeconomic environment often is 
less stable. Lundberg and Squire (2003) for instance find a relationship between higher 
inflation and higher inequality.  
Lastly, two dummy variables for income status are included in order to distinguish income-
specific effects for the total sample. Table 1 presents the entire variable list together with the 
abbreviations, types and expected signs. For further descriptive variable statistics, see table 6 in 
Appendix B.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Variable List 
Variable Abbreviation Type Expected sign 
Gini-variable gini continous  
GDP per capita. growth gdpc continous - 
General protectionism prot continous - 
GDP p.c. growth*general protectionism 
Level of trade*general protectionism 
gdpc*prot 
trade*prot 
interaction 
interaction 
- 
-/+ 
Inflation rate inflation continuous + 
(Import+Export)/GDP trade continuous + 
Protection of food industry foodprot continuous + 
Protection of oil industry oilprot continous - 
Protection of electronics industry electronicsprot continuous - 
Protection of vehicle industry vehiclesprot continous + 
Protection of arms industry armsprot continous - 
Protection of textile industry textileprot continous + 
Upper-middle income country 
Lower-middle income country 
uppermid 
lowermid 
dummy 
dummy 
+ 
+ 
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5 Results 
In this section the results obtained from the regressions will be presented. This will be followed 
by different tests of the sensitivity of the results.   
5.1 Results 
The results obtained from the regressions are shown in table 2. Heteroskedasticity as well as 
serial correlation in the error terms is accounted for by computing robust standard errors in the 
models. The first and second columns represent the baseline regression estimated with OLS and 
Fixed Effects respectively. The baseline LS model in column (1) shows that general trade 
reduces inequality and the coefficient is significant at the 1 per cent level. Further, the dummy 
variables indicating income groups are both positive and statistically significant at the 1 per 
cent level, which suggests a somewhat higher inequality level among the middle-income 
countries.  Due to the ambiguity of previous studies, these results are partly in line with the 
existing literature. The FE model further obtains a positive value for the GDP per capita 
variable, which is significant at the 5 per cent level.  
The third and fourth columns display the extended model, which includes variables for 
protection of specific sectors also estimated by OLS and FE respectively. The FE model still 
obtains a positive sign for GDP per capita at the 5 percent significance level, which indicates 
that GDP growth increases inequality. More, the LS model obtains three statistically significant 
results that disappear in the FE model; general trade reduces inequality, protection of the 
vehicles industry also reduces inequality whereas protection of the arms and ammunition sector 
leads to increasing inequality. Each of the coefficients are significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Finally, protection of the textile sector is significant in both models although they obtain 
different signs. The LS model suggests that protection of the textile sector further increases the 
inequality, whereas the FE model predicts the opposite. In neither of the models a statistically 
significant result for inflation was obtained, although positive signs were expected. In section 
5.2 several sensitivity tests will be performed in order to test for the robustness of these results.  
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Table 2: Effect of Trade Protection on Inequality in 26 Middle-Income Countries During the Period 
2000-2012 (dependent variable, Gini-coefficient). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables LS baseline FE baseline LS industry FE industry 
     
gdpc -0.0694 0.0766** -0.120 0.0639** 
 (0.208) (0.0331) (0.188) (0.0305) 
prot 0.0555 -0.0324   
 (0.0339) (0.0320)   
inflation -0.0100 -0.00122 -0.0374 -0.00437 
 (0.0608) (0.0201) (0.0655) (0.0188) 
gdpc*prot -0.0139 -0.175 0.409 -0.0778 
 (0.532) (0.121) (0.493) (0.108) 
trade -0.0314*** -0.00851 -0.0471*** -0.00558 
 (0.00855) (0.0194) (0.00831) (0.0170) 
uppermid 0.0497***    
 (0.0129)    
lowermid 0.0394***    
 (0.0139)    
foodmax   0.0108 -0.0129 
   (0.0102) (0.00912) 
oilmax   0.0435 -0.0235 
   (0.0346) (0.0190) 
electromax   0.0262 0.0181 
   (0.0465) (0.0325) 
vehiclesmax   -0.221*** -0.0140 
   (0.0255) (0.0278) 
armsmax   0.275*** 0.0119 
   (0.0320) (0.0280) 
textilemax   0.0814* -0.0753** 
   (0.0470) (0.0322) 
Constant 0.318*** 0.399*** 0.340*** 0.416*** 
 (0.0196) (0.0128) (0.0171) (0.0136) 
     
Observations 297 297 297 297 
R-squared 0.156 0.358 0.306 0.409 
Number of countries  26  26 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: STATA 
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5.2 Robustness 
In this section, a couple of robustness checks of the results obtained in section 5.1 are 
conducted. As stated above, the models are tested both with OLS and with FE in order to test 
the importance of unobserved heterogeneity for the relationship between trade protection and 
inequality. The results suggest that the sample is too small and the variation is too little to be 
able to obtain significant results while controlling for country- and year specific effects 
although they point out the need for it. This problem will further be discussed in section 6.  
5.2.1 Regional Differences 
By recognizing the heterogeneity among the included countries it is interesting to investigate 
whether regional differences are present in the sample. By identifying the majority of the 
countries in the sample as Latin American, we may suspect that the results from Table 1 are 
biased. This problem may however be overcome by accounting for regional effects. Hence, in 
order to test regional differences the extended model will be regressed for every region and the 
results are presented in table 3. Due to data limitations, only one country from Africa is 
included in the sample and hence this region will be excluded.  
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Table 3: Effect of Trade Protection on Inequality in Different Regions During the Period 2000-2012 
(dependent variable, Gini-coefficient). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables Lat. 
America LS 
Lat. 
America FE 
Asia            
LS 
Asia        
FE 
Caucasus     
LS 
Caucasus 
FE 
       
gdpc -0.108 0.108* 0.369 -0.173 0.166** 0.0740 
 (0.138) (0.0535) (0.612) (0.344) (0.0775) (0.0378) 
inflation 0.0133 0.0125 -0.124* 0.119 0.0406 0.00835 
 (0.0167) (0.0150) (0.0705) (0.107) (0.0487) (0.0311) 
gdpc*prot 0.293 -0.213* -0.633 0.257 -0.394 0.120 
 (0.306) (0.113) (1.338) (0.947) (0.331) (0.196) 
trade 0.00389 -0.0161 0.00834 -0.0371 -0.0516*** 0.0408 
 (0.00580) (0.0159) (0.0149) (0.0286) (0.0103) (0.0313) 
foodprot -0.0169*** -0.0113 0.000548 0.331* 0.0326** 0.00627 
 (0.00643) (0.0101) (0.0522) (0.0998) (0.0122) (0.0100) 
oilprot 0.0222 -0.00752 -0.125** -0.0365 -0.00773 -0.0275 
 (0.0187) (0.0144) (0.0490) (0.0381) (0.0305) (0.0253) 
electroprot 0.102** 0.0602** -0.0975*** 0.670 -0.281** 0.142** 
 (0.0429) (0.0247) (0.0336) (0.530) (0.139) (0.0423) 
vehiclesprot 0.133*** 0.0547** 0.0823 -0.756 -0.193* 0.0192 
 (0.0343) (0.0203) (0.0692) (0.527) (0.106) (0.0318) 
armsprot -0.121*** -0.0538** 0.0402* -0.187 0.308*** 0.0135 
 (0.0345) (0.0211) (0.0214) (0.106) (0.106) (0.0287) 
textileprot -0.196*** -0.117*** -0.0526 -0.127 -0.00427 -0.176* 
 (0.0363) (0.0353) (0.0422) (0.343) (0.109) (0.0711) 
  (0.00617)  (0.185)  (0.0214) 
Constant 0.434*** 0.441*** 0.362*** 0.158 0.312*** 0.321*** 
 (0.0111) (0.0136) (0.0771) (0.141) (0.0142) (0.0311) 
       
Observations 183 183 32 32 64 64 
R-squared 0.220 0.682 0.866 0.882 0.579 0.590 
Number of countries  15  3  6 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: STATA 
 
For Latin America, the FE regression obtains significant results for both the GDP per capita 
variable as well as for the interaction variable (gdpc*prot), which disappears in the LS 
regression. The FE model suggests that increased economic growth increases inequality. The 
interaction variable tells us that general protection reduces inequality as the country income 
increases. The LS model obtains a negative result for protection of the food industry, which is 
significant at the 1 per cent level, and implies that increased protection of this sector is positive 
for inequality. Furthermore, significant results for protection of the electronics- and machinery 
sector are now obtained in both the LS and FE regressions. Increased protection of this sector 
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increases the inequality, and the coefficients are significant at the 5 per cent level in both 
models. Protection of the vehicle sector also obtains positive significant results at the 5 per cent 
level, indicating that protection of this sector leads to increased inequality. Protecting the arms- 
and ammunition industry, on the other hand, reduces inequality in Latin America in contrast to 
the effect of the other regions, and the variable is significant at the 5 per cent level in both 
regressions. Finally, a negative and statistically significant sign at the 1 per cent level is also 
obtained for the textile sector, telling us that protection of this sector is beneficial for the 
income distribution in Latin America.  
As regards Asia, a negative sign if obtained for inflation and the coefficient is significant at the 
10 per cent level. Further, the LS regression obtains significant results for protection of the oil-, 
machinery and electronics-, and the arms and ammunition sectors, which disappear when using 
the FE method. These results indicate that protection of the oil sector has the effect of reducing 
inequality, which is also true for protection of the electronics and machinery sector. Protecting 
the arms and ammunition sector, on the other hand, increases inequality in Asia.  
By moving on to Caucasus, the LS regression in column (5) obtains significant results for the 
variables for GDP per capita growth and trade. The coefficient for GDP per capita growth 
indicates that economic growth is increases inequality, and is significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Trade, on the other hand, is positive for inequality and significant at the 1 per cent level. These 
results disappear in the FE regression. More, protection of the food industry increases 
inequality and significant at the 5 per cent level. Protection of the arms industry also increases 
inequality and the coefficient is significant at the 1 per cent level. Contrarily, protection of the 
electronics- and the vehicle industries reduces inequality, and the variables are significant at the 
5 and 10 per cent level, respectively. When controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, as in 
column (6), the model is able to find two statistically significant results.  Protection of the 
textile sector reduces inequality and the coefficient is significant at the 1 per cent level, and 
protection of the electronics industry is now negative for inequality and the coefficient is 
significant at the 5 per cent level. Hence, the results vary to some extent across the regions and 
they will be further discussed in section 6. 
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5.2.2 Income-based Differences  
With the result of Meschi and Vivarelli (2007) in mind, which proved differences in the effect 
of trade on income distribution between low- and middle-income countries, it also becomes 
interesting with a similar test in this study. Since the countries included in this sample are 
approximately equally divided between upper-middle-, and lower-middle-income countries, the 
extended model will be tested for both country groups and the results are presented in columns 
(1)-(4) of Table 4. The main result is that trade reduces income inequality in both LS 
regressions, implying that being an upper- or lower-income country is not determining for 
inequality. Further, protection of the oil industry is positive for the poorer group and negative 
for the other group according to the LS models. The variable is significant at the 10 per cent 
level for the lower-income group, and at the 1 per cent level for the upper-income group. More, 
protection of the textile sector reduces inequality in the lower-middle income group according 
to the LS model, and the coefficient is significant at the 10 per cent level. This effect disappears 
in the FE model. The upper-middle income group obtains a similar result for the textile sector, 
although the effect that is present and significant at the 1 per cent level in the FE model 
disappears in the LS model. Finally, for the lower-middle income group, protection of the food 
industry reduces inequality according to the FE model, and arms protection increases inequality 
and both variables are significant at the 1 per cent level.  
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Table 4: Effect of Trade Protection on Inequality By Income-level Groups, 2000-2012 (dependent 
variable, Gini-coefficient). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables Lower-mid 
LS 
Lower-mid  
FE 
Upper-mid 
LS 
Upper-mid 
FE 
     
gdpc -0.0158 0.00888 -0.00761 -0.0217 
 (0.212) (0.0410) (0.142) (0.0552) 
gdpc*prot 0.171 0.202 0.0597 0.121 
 (0.773) (0.214) (0.402) (0.130) 
inflation 0.0231 -0.0170 -0.134 0.00828 
 (0.0532) (0.0178) (0.0831) (0.0225) 
trade -0.0347* 0.00443 -0.0332*** 0.00226 
 (0.0177) (0.0244) (0.0107) (0.0212) 
foodprot -0.0312 -0.0192*** -0.00626 0.0172 
 (0.0218) (0.00333) (0.0101) (0.0121) 
oilprot -0.109* -0.0133 0.135*** 0.00145 
 (0.0649) (0.0173) (0.0328) (0.0123) 
electronicsprot -0.0298 0.0283 0.00182 0.0614** 
 (0.146) (0.0493) (0.0399) (0.0213) 
vehiclesprot -0.0468 0.0278 0.0181 0.0150 
 (0.0622) (0.0477) (0.0398) (0.0180) 
armsprot 0.588*** -0.100 0.00281 -0.0100 
 (0.0872) (0.0566) (0.0415) (0.0203) 
textileprot -0.171* -0.0908 0.0385 -0.0855*** 
 (0.0948) (0.0513) (0.0675) (0.0226) 
  (0.00908)  (0.00524) 
Constant 0.346*** 0.429*** 0.352*** 0.405*** 
 (0.0202) (0.0133) (0.0158) (0.0170) 
     
Observations 140 140 128 128 
R-squared 0.344 0.681 0.275 0.551 
Number of countries  12  11 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: STATA 
 
5.2.3 Protection and the Level of Trade 
As a last robustness check, the variable for trade will be excluded from the baseline model in 
order to test whether this improves the fit of the model. The results are presented in columns 
(1)-(4) of table 5. Column (1) and (2) represent the baseline regression and are included in 
order to facilitate comparisons. In column (3) and (4) the trade variable has been excluded. 
More, an interaction term, (trade*prot), will further be included into the baseline model in order 
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to see how the effect of protection on inequality varies with the level of trade. The results are 
presented in column (5) and (6).  
 
Table 5: The effect of Trade Protection on Inequality when Accounting for Heterogeneity Based on 
Trade Levels (dependent variable, Gini-coefficient). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables LS Baseline FE Baseline LS  
-trade 
FE  
-trade 
LS  
+interaction 
FE  
+interact
ion 
       
gdpc -0.0754 0.0766** -0.0513 0.0672* -0.0857 0.0570* 
 (0.212) (0.0331) (0.225) (0.0395) (0.219) (0.0303) 
prot 0.0668* -0.0324 0.0505 -0.0115 0.0491 -0.0404 
 (0.0363) (0.0320) (0.0363) (0.0398) (0.0404) (0.0262) 
gdpc*prot -0.152 -0.175 -0.512 -0.213 -0.221 -0.142 
 (0.552) (0.121) (0.557) (0.154) (0.582) (0.0875) 
-inflation -0.0327 -0.00122 -0.0497 0.0246 -0.0509 -0.0160 
 (0.0620) (0.0201) (0.0673) (0.0233) (0.0679) (0.0241) 
trade -0.0386*** -0.00851     
 (0.00758) (0.0194)     
  (0.00657)    (0.00827
) 
trade*prot     -0.0769*** 0.0697* 
     (0.0248) (0.0378) 
Constant 0.356*** 0.399*** 0.380*** 0.378*** 0.372*** 0.414*** 
 (0.0152) (0.0128) (0.0144) (0.0164) (0.0151) (0.0133) 
       
Observatio
ns 
297 297 297 297 297 297 
R-squared 0.102 0.358 0.027 0.021 0.055 0.372 
Number of 
countries 
 26  26  26 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Source: STATA 
 
It is clear from table 5 that the fit of the model is deteriorated when excluding the variable for 
trade. When including an interaction term the model however gets improved when estimated by 
FE. The interaction term is significant at the 10 per cent level and tells us that as the level of 
trade increases, increasing protection increases inequality. The GDP per capita growth variable 
continues significant and increases inequality as it grows 
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5.2.4 Endogeneity 
The problem of endogeneity often arises as a result of three circumstances; measurement errors, 
omitted variables and simultaneity. This problem might bias the estimates and hence give 
unreliable results. When studying the relationship between trade and inequality, there is likely a 
problem of distinguishing the direction of causality. The argument of the traditional model and 
the Stolper-Samuelson effect described above is that trade between developing (low-skilled) 
and developed (high-skilled) countries will decrease the wage gap in the developing country 
and increase it in the developed country. However, it can also be the reverse case, that a change 
in the income distribution within a country may change the country’s trade flows. For instance, 
if the cost of producing a good using the abundant factor intensively increases due to the 
change in incomes, then the relative comparative advantage of the country deteriorates and we 
can expect changes in the trade pattern, leading to biased estimates of the effect of trade on 
inequality.  
Endogeneity can partly be corrected for when working with panel data by applying the FE 
model as it effectively evens out unobserved heterogeneity. Another technique of addressing 
the endogeneity problem is to apply instrumental variables for the trade flows. However, since 
a convenient instrument for trade flows generally is of policy character (inward- and outward 
orientation), the method is not suitable when working with cross-country samples due to 
limitations in accessing such data. Hence, in this study the FE approach addresses the expected 
problem of endogeneity.  
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6 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this section the results will be discussed and a final conclusion will be drawn. Due to the 
rather contradictive results, the main focus of the discussion will be to explain the likely 
reasons for this from a theoretical as well as practical perspective.  
6.1 Discussion of the Results 
So far, this paper has established that general trade is positive for middle-income countries in 
terms of inequality, although trade in specific industries have varying impacts on inequality 
depending on which industry and which region that is considered. For the total sample, the 
results suggest that protection of the vehicle industry reduces inequality, whereas protecting the 
arms and ammunition industry increases inequality. The opposite effects were expected since 
production and import of arms and ammunition is technically more advanced and requires more 
skilled labour than production of vehicles, which is normally associated to factory workers with 
less education. Trade with arms and ammunition would thus theoretically increase the demand 
for skilled labour and hence increase the wage gap and inequality. Protection of the textile 
sector also reduces inequality when country- and year-specific effects are accounted for. This is 
also the opposite of the expected result, since this kind of production is not characterized by the 
use of high skills and hence trade in this sector was expected to increase the demand for 
unskilled labour and thus raise their wages.  
Both models are regressed with both the LS and the FE method in order to test the robustness 
of the results. Since many of the effects disappear in the FE models, we may expect other 
unobserved factors and policies not covered by this analysis to be more important when 
explaining the development of inequality. We thus have something in the error term correlating 
with trade and trade protection. This may for instance be educational policy, which possibly 
have high impacts on the relationship between trade and inequality. If liberalizing trade implies 
an increased demand for skills, then the educational system determines whether the country 
will be able to fulfil this demand. If the access to the educational system is restricted to a small 
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share of the population, then this may work as an obstacle for development and thus increase 
the demand for a small group of people. Hence, the educational system may be a determining 
factor when evaluating the impact of a trade policy on. Savvides (1998) for instance finds 
increased human capital investments to reduce inequality, which further strengthens this 
discussion. More, the infrastructure within a country may also be of major importance for the 
inequality development. If some sectors expand due to increased demand from abroad, lacking 
infrastructure may hinder the reallocation of resources needed in order for the industries to 
reply to the increased demand. International investors normally invest in urban areas where the 
infrastructure is better, and hence many people from poorer rural areas are hindered from 
enjoying this development. Thus, poor infrastructure may have the effect of excluding the 
poorest from enjoying increased demand of labour arising from trade. Unemployment may also 
be determining for the development of inequality since it implies that resources are not used in 
the best possible way. In developing countries, unskilled labour is often affected hardest by 
unemployment when countries devote to more skill-intensive production. Hence, the utilization 
of resources by a country is also determining for the inequality.  
As commented above, the obtained positive sign of the GDP per capita growth variable 
indicates that economic growth affects inequality negatively when country-specific effects are 
introduced. The theory of Kuznetz (1955) predicted this result for economies in early stages of 
development. Nevertheless, due to the heterogeneity among the countries included in this panel 
data and that the majority of the countries actually are upper- or lower-middle-income 
countries, we may expect that Kuznetz’s theory of initial stages also holds for later stages of 
development, and that the relationship is not U-shaped as predicted. The model suggests that 
economic growth mainly benefits higher income groups. There may be political reasons for this 
result, which are out of the scope of this paper to discuss, and it calls for a further investigation 
of who actually gains from growth. 
Although a positive sign for inflation was expected, a significant result was not obtained for the 
total sample. However, when accounting for regional effects, a negative sign is obtained in the 
LS regression for Asia. Hence, increased inflation has the effect of lowering the income 
inequality in Asia. This result is quite contradictive and not in line with previous literature. 
However, it suggests that increased inflation does not erode real incomes in a manner that 
affects the poor hardest but rather the opposite.  
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By continuing with regional differences, it is important to stress that due to the small amount of 
countries included in some regions, the results may be somewhat misleading as little variation 
can be seen. The interaction variable now gets significant for Latin America and tells us that 
general protection reduces inequality as the country income increases This result is in line with 
that of Mesche and Vivarelly (2007), which proved that increased inequality from trade is 
stronger for middle-income countries that are more absorptive and may adopt new technology. 
The increased demand for skilled labour is hence stronger for middle-income countries than for 
low-income countries according to these authors, and the increase in inequality is stronger. 
Thus, we expect protection to have a stronger, reducing, effect on inequality as the income 
increases. More, we see that trade is only positive in terms of inequality for Caucasus whereas 
it cannot be supported for Latin America and Asia. Further, protection of specific industries has 
different effects on inequality for different regions. The likely explanations for this are 
differences in abundances across the regions, which reply differently to trade in terms of 
inequality, as well as the unobserved non-trade policies discussed above that together with 
trade policies jointly affect inequality. These arguments are important to have in mind for the 
remainder of the regional regressions. For instance, protection of the food industry in Latin 
America reduces inequality while it increases inequality in the other regions. This result is quite 
contradictive, since Latin America is unskilled labour abundant and has many local small-scale 
producers. Hence, trade in this sector was expected to increase the demand for unskilled labour 
and thereby lower the inequality, but rather protection was found to increase inequality.  
Protection of the machinery and electronics industry however increases inequality in Latin 
America and Caucasus and decreases it for Asia. The result of Asia is thus the only one that 
supports the theory of increased inequality due to increased demand for skilled labour when 
trading with advanced technology, and is thus in line with the expected result.  
Protecting the vehicles industry further increases inequality in Latin America while decreasing 
it in Caucasus. Hence, only Latin America obtains the expected sign, since the vehicles 
industry is, as commented above, a fairly unskilled-intensive industry and trade in this sector 
was thus expected to increase the demand for unskilled labour and thereby decrease inequality.   
The results for the arms- and ammunition sector are somewhat contradictive to the previous 
results discussed as they indicate that for Latin America, protection of the arms and 
ammunition industry is positive for inequality whereas protecting it in Asia and Caucasus 
generates higher inequality. It is contradictive since protection of the machinery sector, which 
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also is advanced and skill-intensive and thus requires more skilled labour, gave the opposite 
effect. However, it is in line with late theory since arms and ammunition generally is very 
advanced and naturally requires educated labour to handle or producing it. Hence, having a 
large arms and ammunition industry naturally comes with a larger demand for skilled labour, 
which is why trade in this sector may be negative for inequality. However, the opposite effect is 
seen in Asia and Caucasus.  
More, protection of the textile industry reduces inequality in both Latin America and Caucasus. 
Again, this is a contradictive result since the textile industry is more unskilled labour-intensive 
in its production than the other sector. Thus protection of this sector was expected to inhibit the 
increased demand for unskilled labour stemming from trade, and thus increase inequality.   
Finally, the only region obtaining a significant sign for protection of the oil industry is Asia and 
the result suggests that protecting it reduces inequality. Since this industry generally is 
characterized by very advanced technology this sign was expected according to the discussions 
of increased demand for skilled labour when trading with advanced technology above. As the 
result disappears in the FE model we may assume for example political and reasons having 
larger impacts on inequality than trade policies included into this model.  
When comparing the impacts of trade in different sectors it becomes of great importance to also 
mention something about the production pattern within countries. The production within a 
country may be skewed towards sectors that are more intensive in skilled alternatively 
unskilled labour. This may off course greatly influence the results when valuating the impact of 
a trade policy on inequality. It may also be that the tariff reduction is skewed towards sectors 
with more skilled or more unskilled labour. If an industry that is intensive in unskilled labour 
experiences a large reduction in tariffs, then the price of the produced good will be reduced and 
consequently the return to the factor it uses intensively, which is unskilled labour, will also fall, 
according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Hence, inequality may be affected by other 
circumstances than the specific trade policy. What may further influence the effect of a trade 
policy on income inequality is the labour rigidity often prevalent in developing countries. 
Labour rigidity may work as an obstacle to resource reallocations as a response to economic 
reform, which may have the effect of increasing the return to specific occupations. This 
naturally hinders efficiency gains from trade policies and may lead to the richer and educated 
part of the population getting even more demanded on the labour market and thus increased 
inequality.  
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The next step was to compare the effects between lower- and upper-middle-income countries in 
order to detect whether the absorptive ability of higher-income countries was different of that in 
the lower-income countries as suggested and proofed by Meschi and Vivarelli (2007). What 
differs this analyse from that of Meschi and Vivarelly is that they focus on the differences in 
the effect of international trade for low-income countries (LICs) and middle-income countries 
(MICs), whereas this study compares the effect between upper-middle- and lower-middle-
income countries. Hence, weaker differences were expected since the differences in income 
among the countries in this sample are smaller than among the countries in their study. The 
estimates reveal that trade still is positive in terms of inequality for both groups, implying that 
being an upper- or lower-income country is not determining for inequality. The results further 
indicate unobserved heterogeneity as explained above. More, protection of the oil industry 
reduces inequality for the lower income group whereas it increases inequality in the upper 
income group. In order to be in line with the results of Mechi and Vivarelli, the opposite result 
was expected. Due to the advanced technology required in the production and trade with oil, 
trade was expected to increase the demand for skilled labour and hence increase the wage gap, 
and thus protection of this sector was expected to decrease inequality. Thus, these results 
cannot support those of Meschi and Vivarelli of higher income countries being more absorptive 
in upgrading their technology towards those of more advanced economies and thus having 
higher inequality effects. The next comparable result is that of protection of the textile sector, 
which shows similar positive results for both income groups. Hence, as expected, no large 
differences were found in the relationship between upper-middle- and lower-middle income 
countries. 
Finally, including an interaction term of the level of trade and the level of protection into the 
model suggests that as the level of trade increases, higher protection leads to increased 
inequality.  
With respect to the heterogeneity among the countries in this dataset, a single answer to 
whether trade protection is positive or negative for the within-country inequality is thus not 
possible. Moreover, there are several non-country or non-sector specific technical factors that 
likely influence the results obtained in papers studying the relationship between trade policies 
and inequality in developing countries. In the first place, there is an enormous lack of data on 
inequality and other development indicators for developing countries. This, first of all, leads to 
very little variation in the data and thus complicates analytical processes in order to identify 
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certain patterns. Further, this tends to bias the general evidence of trade and inequality towards 
regions that keep data. The countries for which there is recent evidence, as commented above, 
tend to be Latin American and Asian since these are the only regions with somewhat complete 
data of inequality for the past decades. Hence, the evidence on this topic cannot be 
representative for developing countries or middle-income countries in general if regional 
effects are not accounted for. However, in order to do this for the region of Africa, more data is 
required. Furthermore, most of the, to different extents, developing countries keeping this kind 
of data are generally middle-income countries, and thus the data does not cover low-income 
countries. Hence, more data and research is required in order to investigate the impact of trade 
on inequality. 
The evidence is also affected by the period that the study covers. Many papers focus on the 
period before and after the 1980s when trade liberalization programs were implemented in 
many developing countries and inequality begun to rise. Studying more recent data, however, 
as in this paper, may capture the long-run effects of those programs. Hence, recent studies may 
suggest other effects of trade on inequality than the older ones.  
Lastly, differing results between earlier and more recent studies on this topic may be due to the 
change in the structure of trade as commented above, which has become more focused on 
intermediate inputs rather than on finished goods. Many earlier studies also fail to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity due to the methods used to investigate the relationship between trade 
and inequality, which makes more recent results, such as those of this paper, more reliable.  
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6.2 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the links between trade protection and inequality for 26 middle-income 
countries during the period 2000-2012. It further examines whether sectorial trade exposure is 
of importance for the relationship. To motivate this topic, the discrepancy between the 
prediction of reduced inequality from trade of the traditional theory, and the evidence of 
increasing within-country inequality since the beginning of the 1980s is presented.  
This is investigated by applying both an LS and an FE approach. I find no evidence for the 
effect of general trade protection on inequality. However, general trade, measured as the ratio 
of exports and imports over GDP, is found to reduce inequality. When accounting for regional 
differences, the effect of trade protection on inequality is found to strongly depend on which 
industry and which region that is considered. I expect to find inequality-decreasing effects from 
protection in high skill-intensive industries such as machinery and arms, since trade in these 
industries is believed to increase the demand for skilled labour and hence increase inequality. 
Oppositely, I expect to find inequality-increasing effects from protection in unskilled labour-
intensive industries, since trade in these sectors is believed to increase the demand for unskilled 
labour and thus reduce inequality. However, the results are overall contradictive. Protection of 
certain sectors reduces inequality in some regions, while increasing it in others. I discuss 
several likely reasons for the contradiction of my results. The FE models suggest unobserved 
factors in the error terms that correlate with trade and trade protection. One likely such factor is 
the differences in abundances that the countries possess, which are not accounted for by the 
models. Differing abundances can greatly affect the impact of a trade policy on inequality due 
to the change in demand that may arise when opening up for trade. More, non-trade policies of 
for example educational or infrastructural character may jointly or multiply determine 
inequality together with trade policies. For instance, if trade is liberalized and as a result the 
demand for skilled labour increases, then the educational system determines whether the 
country will be able to respond to this demand. If the access to education is restricted to a small 
share of the population, then increased trade may lead to increased inequality by increasing the 
demand for a small share of people. Thus, the effect of a trade policy on inequality strongly 
depends on other unobserved policies, which are not covered by this study. With respect to 
these conclusions, control variables for education and infrastructure would be interesting and 
very relevant to include into models of future similar research.  
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Further, I was not able to distinguish different effects of trade protection on inequality when 
accounting for income differences in the sample, as suggested by Mesche and Vivarelli (2007). 
However, as I distinguished among upper-middle- and lower-middle income countries, the 
differences in income may have been too small in order to detect different impacts of trade on 
inequality. Hence, I further stress practical obstacles when examining this topic such as the lack 
of existing data for low-income countries, which thus becomes underrepresented in these 
studies.   
Lastly, I motivate the ambiguity of the empirical evidence on the links between trade and 
inequality with the period of the analysis. Both due to the structure of trade that has changed 
and lately become more focused on trade in intermediate inputs rather than in final goods, 
which may affect inequality. And as well because the methods of many earlier studies fail to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity, which I have discussed to be essential when evaluating 
the effects of a trade policy on inequality.  
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Appendix A: Estimation Sample and Country 
Groups 
 
 
Countries used in sample: Argentina, Armenia, Bolivia, Brazil, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, 
Mexico, Moldova, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Russian Federation, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia. 
• Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela 
• Asian countries: China, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam 
• Caucasian countries: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova*, Russian Federation, Ukraine*, 
Turkey 
• African countries: Zambia 
 
Income country groups: World Bank classification of countries by income: lower-middle 
income economies; $1,046-$4,125, upper-middle income economies; $4,125-$12,735.  
• Upper-middle income countries: Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Russian Federation, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela 
• Lower-middle income countries: Armenia, Bolivia, China, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Georgia, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Moldova, Paraguay, Thailand, Ukraine 
 
*: not officially Caucasian countries. 
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Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
Variables  Obs.  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Gini  267 0.466 0.082 0.248 0.63 
Gdpc  351 0.047 0.042 -0.148 0.183 
Prot  351 0.309 0.228 0.04 2.348 
Inflation  329 0.081 0.090 -0.017 0.961 
Trade   351 0.749 0.341 0.217 1.630 
Foodprot  302 0.658 0.800 0.1 3 
Oilprot  318 0.191 0.159 0.05 1.04 
Electronicsprot 300 0.216 0.150 0 1.55 
Vehiclesprot  302 0.339 0.453 0 5 
Armsprot  303 0.212 0.400 0 5 
Textileprot  293 0.248 0.200 0 1.51 
 
 
 
